Why governments depend less on local researchers in Nigeria|Tunji Olaopa
Speaking ex tempore can be quite challenging especially when the issue you are raising is quite germane, and you might not be able to speak to its nuances on the spur of the moment. Thus, when Professor Antonia Simbine, the Director General of the National Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER), visited my office as the Chairman of the Federal Civil Service Commission (FCSC) most recently, the cumulation of our discussion veered, not surprisingly, towards policy architecture, local research outputs and Nigeria’s productivity profile.
When I, therefore, made the argument that there is a crucial disconnect between local research outputs and Nigeria’s policy space—that “our experts’ output (are) gradually (becoming) irrelevant and consigned to publications and for individual promotion and professional development and not as input into the public policy making process”—I was not attempting to generate a soundbite that would generate notoriety.
On the contrary, I was simply alluding to a national reality that requires more analysis to unravel its critical nuances. My statement to the press only provides a partial picture of what is really wrong with the policy-research nexus in Nigeria. This contribution is simply a modest attempt to build on my statement as a measure of recognition of the significance of the subject matter.
A significant dimension of my institutional reform concerns has always been the policy-research nexus that could be energised by the town-gown. The policy-research linkage refers to the relationship between policy makers and the academia that strengthen strategic policy intelligence and the need for critical problem-solving in governance.
My policy-engaged research advocacy derived from the belief that Nigeria’s development planning and management has a lot to benefit from a reinvented town and gown symbiotic relationship. This belief has a historical basis in the immediate post-independence period when Nigeria was struggling to put together a development structure that will serve as the basis for good and democratic governance.
This instigated a community of practice that brought academics and scholars into key conversations around the academic and administrative implications of policy designs. The consequence was the development of significant action research hub that stimulate policy intelligence for the government and its policy-making capacities.
This community of practice is what brought the likes of the late Profs. Ojetunji Aboyade and Akinlawon Mabogunje, and Dr Pius Okigbo, into critical policy conversation with Simeon Adebo, Allison Ayida, Ahmed Joda, and the public administration/public service structure into policy-research-industry complementary relationship that government regularly drew upon for its development thinking.
From what we now regard as the golden age of public administration in Nigeria to the present struggle to make sense of democratic governance, a lot has gone wrong both with the policy-making architecture, Nigeria’s higher education dynamics and the significance of research and development (R&D) as the fulcrum for enabling action research and ultimately the policy-research nexus.
There is one obvious culprit that undermine the framework that enables policymakers and researchers/academics collaborate to facilitate policy-research linkage that deploys the trans-disciplinary and interdisciplinary nature of public policy research to ground development planning and good governance.
This culprit is the government’s anti-intellectual posture along the line which takes researchers, think tanks and research institutes as interlopers and non-significant actors in the policy process rather than as critical partners and stakeholders. This is a charge that should not be taken lightly. It is one that has been borne out by my entire professional trajectory as a public servant with a significant interest in studying the intellectual basis of public administration in Nigeria, and its interface with academia and other intellectual resources available to the government in terms of its policymaking function and service delivery requirements.
My intellectual and professional tutelage under Aboyade and Mabogunje, for example, also further accentuated how the public service could be rabidly reactionary against every attempt at facilitating collaboration with the academia and research dynamics.
This is despite the cogent evidence of the role of the town and gown in molding the successes of the Adebo-Udoji up to the era of the Gowon’s super-permanent secretaries in public administration—a situation that got to a height during the IBB era and still subsisted under the Abacha administration with the National Economic Intelligence Committee (NEIC), headed by the late Prof. Sam Aluko. Unfortunately, the commencement of Nigeria’s democratic experiment in 1999 has failed to undermine this anti-intellectual posture and ignite this policy-research collaboration.
There are several consequences deducible from this posture. The first is that the many research institutes, think tanks and tertiary institutions have no visible influence on Nigeria’s policy articulation in ways that qualitatively transform the policy intelligence of government.
A recent study carried out on Nigeria’s sixty-six research institutes paints a very dismal picture of systemic, operational and structural challenges that undermine the contributions that these institutes could make to policymaking. The same can be said for the over two hundred and fifty public and private universities in Nigeria.
This state of affair leads to the second implication of the government’s anti-intellectualism: the failure to ground the framework and protocols of their policymaking practices on economic and statistical rationalities. This implies that successive Nigeria governments plan economic and developmental processes without the benefits of statistical analyses and scenario intelligence that the action and empirical researches of the research institutes, think tanks and tertiary institutions could have provided. This was the crux of Prof. Wolfgang Stolper’s stricture regarding his development experience in Nigeria between 1962 and 1968.
In his book, Planning without Facts: Lessons in Resource Allocation from Nigeria’s Development (1966), Stolper decries the situation where the government articulated development plans within framework of a weak data and statistical culture that could make the development process an evidence-based practice.
Development therefore becomes an arbitrary process of depending on a series of short-run decisions and planning that limits the extent of scientific prediction. This paucity of statistical and data parameters is one of the most singular reasons why the trajectory of Nigeria’s development planning, from the first NDP (1962 to 1968) to the 1992-1994 rolling plan, has impacted good governance for Nigerians.
Credit:The Guardian