Why Nigerian governments pay lip service to civil service reforms|Tunji Olaopa
In a 2005 study of the administrative trajectories of 29 African countries, Ladipo Adamolekun introduced a useful typology for reckoning with the administrative progress of African states. He characterised the 29 African states into four different categories: the advanced, committed, hesitant and beginning reformers. Nigeria fell into the ‘hesitant’ reforming African state. Unlike the committed and advanced reforming states, the hesitant reformers, like Nigeria, manifest the symptoms of not always seeing through reform designs, innovation and ideas, just like we saw with the Udoji reform.
To be hesitant is to be enthusiastic about reform ideas, commit to seeing them through, but stopping short of implementing the key reform innovation in ways that impact the efficient service delivery capability of the public service.
The perfect example that articulates Nigeria’s reform hesitancy is the failure of successive Nigerian governments to deal with the cost of governance issues that has been limiting Nigeria’s institutional coordination and functional capacity. Nigeria operates one of the most expensive governance systems in the world. This derives from the multiplication of structural and institutional processes and dynamics that not only burden budgetary allocations through the large chunk of money spent on recurrent expenditure, but also undermine functional efficiency due to wastage and redundancies.
This phenomenon was consequent on the breakdown of the internal establishment control mechanism built around the control tool of organisation and method (O&M) and the treasury control of establishment that regulates the capital and recurrent ratio of the budget.
The core elements of this controls were the manpower forecasting and planning system of identifying, planning and acting upon human resource requirements and problems related to the conceptualisation of the role of the state in the running of the national economy, as well as the trend analysis of service’s growth in size and expansion of the scope of responsibilities.
The Oronsaye Report—or, the Presidential Committee on the Rationalisation and Restructuring of Federal Government Parastatals, Commissions, and Agencies—was meant to first articulate a rationalisation framework that reduces all parallel, ad hoc and redundant structures; and second, achieve governance accountability that will instigate more efficiency in the conduct of government business.
The overall objective was to get the MDAs to achieve more with less. The Committee was guided by five fundamental principles: (a) the economic challenges and the need for Government to make more efficient use of its resources to achieve its development objectives and goals; (b) the fact that Nigeria had undertaken reforms in the past; (c) it was imperative to reform to meet the challenges of a better socio-political and economic society; (d) there was no need to create another body to perform the functions of an already existing statutory entity.
The fact that an institution was inefficient and ineffective should not warrant the creation of a new one; and (e) the reform would ensure efficient and effective management of Government structures and functionaries to guarantee better service delivery and good governance.
And yet, given the fundamental significance of the Report of the Committee, no government from the Jonathan administration to date has been unlocking the binding constraints nor mustering the audacity to fully implement the recommendations of the Committee. Several reasons can be adduced for this.
The first is that the long-term demands of reforms are counteracted by the short-term tenures of many administrations. Second, since there is no making an omelet without breaking eggs, reform implementation requires offending vested interests that would be affected by the hard-political decision these reforms require.
Third, reforms possess deep and expensive psychological implication due to the trauma that would attend, for instance, the rationalisation and consequent rightsizing of the MDAs will demand in terms of specific downsizing and severance compensations.
However, since institutional reforms are inevitable, it becomes imperative that the Tinubu government has to facilitate specific systemic and structural changes in order to get the basic rights. These include the following: (i) elimination of the dysfunctional non-value adding processes including silos operations which create red tapes and operational bottlenecks; (ii) the efficient activation of the performance bond that MDAs signed with the President as the means of instituting the performance management system; (iii) strengthening of MDAs’ programme and project management capabilities; (iv) the recalibration of research and policy analysis functions of MDAs through the re-professionalisation of their Department of Planning, Research and Statistics (DPRS); (v) the identification of core skills requirements of the MDAs that touch on the implementation of the Renewed Hope Agenda, and their sourcing and deployment through retraining, fresh recruitment, contract appointment, staff exchange, sabbatical, donor technical assistance, etc.; (vi) strengthening the merit system through more rigorous entry-level assessment and induction system to mitigate the extent to which the service inherits low-quality education and deficits from the tertiary institutions; (vii) reprofiling of public service institutional capacity to better optimise the potentials of PPPs to boost service delivery; and (viii) the imperative of launching a national waste reduction strategy that involves (a) the unbundling of the expenditure structure of government; (b) productivity audit of the MDAs, (c) getting MDAs to articulate their productivity and waste reduction plans based on agreed national benchmark, (d) launching of the productivity metrics and tools for holding MDAs accountable to national productivity targets, and (e) launching of the new national assets and facility management and national maintenance system.
However, and preparatory to institutionalising the above, it is logical and expedient thatthe Tinubu administration establish the Programme Management Office (PMO) in the short term to act as the MDAs’ institutional life support model. This becomes functional, for instance, in generating project management ideas which can then be mainstreamed to activate performance-managed operations in the MDAs.
This will serve to reinforce the MDAs with required skills and competency upgrade needed to deliver high performance that urgently backstops the Renewed Hope Agenda. This involves, among other things, a backend review of the capability readiness of the MDAs (or at least carefully selected ones based on criteria that are aligned with the eight national policy objectives and priorities of the federal government).
There is also, following on this, the need to activate the performance management system components of the Federal Civil Service Implementation Strategy. This demand that the federal government institutionally insist, through the support of key players provided by a consortium of experts and firms, that the MDA deliver on the performance bonds signed with the government.
The Tinubu administration has what it takes, in terms of extant reform blueprints and designs, professional expertise and technocratic know-how, and the political will to break the jinx that has bedeviled other administrations in terms of passing on reform ideas that could have turned the tide of efficient service delivery to Nigerians. All that is required is taking the first step, say, by going full throttle with the implementation of the Oronsaye Report, and dealing a final blow to the cost of the governance problem in Nigeria’s governance framework.
Concluded.
Olaopa is chairman, Federal Civil Service Commission and Professor of Public Administration.
Credit:The Guardian